Colloquia, Spring 2018

Colloquia, Spring 2018 2018-01-26T16:50:59+00:00

All talks are from 3:30 to 5:00 p.m. in room 32-155. For further information, please contact SherryYadav, or Danfeng. This schedule is subject to change; please check back for changes.

February 16, 2018
  • Colloquium: Lucas Champollion [NYU]

    February 16, 2018 @ 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
    32-155

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March 9, 2018
  • Colloquium: Sandhya Sundaresan [Uni Leipzig]

    March 9, 2018 @ 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
    32-155

    I present the following three types of evidence that challenge both context-overwriting and quantifier-binding approaches to indexical shift (the phenomenon where the denotation of an indexical is interpreted, not against the utterance context, but against the index associated with an intensional verb). (I) Systematic exceptions to Shift Together (the constraint that all shiftable indexicals in a local intensional domain must shift together) in Tamil, varieties of Zazaki and Turkish, and potentially also Late Egyptian; (II) novel evidence from imperatives in Korean and supporting secondary data from imperatives in Slovenian, showing that the utterance…

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March 23, 2018
  • Colloquium: Judith Tonhauser [Ohio State]

    March 23, 2018 @ 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
    32-155

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April 6, 2018
  • Colloquium: Lyn Frazier [UMass Amherst]

    April 6, 2018 @ 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
    32-155

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May 4, 2018
  • Colloquium: Ryan Bennett [Yale/UCSC]

    May 4, 2018 @ 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
    32-155

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May 11, 2018
  • Ling-Phil Joint Colloquium (Daniel Rothschild, University College London)

    May 11, 2018 @ 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
    32-155

    What it takes to believe

    Much linguistic evidence supports the view that believing something only requires thinking it likely. I assess and reject a rival view, based on recent work on homogeneity in natural language, according to which belief is a more demanding attitude. I discuss the implications of the linguistic considerations about believe for our philosophical accounts of belief.

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